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Semi-Decentralized Coordinated Online Learning for Continuous
Games with Coupled Constraints via Augmented Lagrangian
Ezra Tampubolon and Holger Boche
Abstract—We consider a class of concave continuous games
in which the corresponding admissible strategy profile of each
player underlies affine coupling constraints. We propose a novel
algorithm that leads the corresponding population dynamic
toward Nash equilibrium. This algorithm is based on a mirror
ascent algorithm, which suits with the framework of no-regret
online learning, and on the augmented Lagrangian method.
The decentralization aspect of the algorithm corresponds to
the aspects that the iterate of each player requires the local
information of about how she contributes to the coupling
constraints and the price vector broadcasted by a central
coordinator. So each player need not know about the population
action. Moreover, no specific control by the central coordinator
is required. We give a condition on the step sizes and the degree
of the augmentation of the Lagrangian, such that the proposed
algorithm converges to a generalized Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Competitive non-cooperative selfish agents appear as a
model in a vast number of applications (see also [1]) such as
smart grid [2]–[11], competitive markets [12], and congestion
control for networks [13]. The famous concept of non-
cooperative continuous game theory is suited to analyze
such applications: The typical setting is that a set of agents
repeatedly interact with each other, in the sense that at time t
the payoff/reward of an agent depends not only on his action
but also on the joint action of all other agents which is not
visible for him.
Given the uncertainty faced by one agent about the joint
action of the others, he has therefore to choose his action in
an online manner aiming to optimize his time-variant reward
(for detailed discussions see [14] and references therein). A
reasonable assumption on their behavior is that they apply the
no-regret policy (see, e.g., [14], [15]) known in the literature
of online learning. The canonical class of no-regret policies
in the black-box environment, i.e., in the environment where
no further assumptions on the utility functions puiqi other
than concavity, is the so-called online mirror ascent which
is a canonical extension of famous mirror ascent algorithm.
Mirror ascent consists at each time instance the gradient step
in the dual space and the "mirror" step which maps it back
to the feasible primal region.
In applications, there is often a coupling between the
ideal agent’s action set and the actual other agents’ action.
Some examples are TCP (congestion) control problem [16],
where the transmit rates of the agents underly capacity link
constraints, the problem of charging of electrical vehicles
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[8], where a threshold of the total demand of the units of
power of the agents is available, and MIMO interference
systems (see e.g. [1] and references therein), where the
transmission strategies of the secondary users (agents) in
the form of power allocation vectors over the sub-carriers
underly sum constraint. Notice that in all the previously
mentioned applications, the coupled constrained is of affine
form.
In this work, we consider a novel mirror ascent based
algorithms for concave games that can handle coupled affine
constraints. In each time step, each agents executes a mirror
ascent update which requires locally available first-order
information of their utility function and the price vector
broadcasted by the central coordinator. The latter is updated
by the central coordinator using the augmented-Lagrangian-
based update. We give a sufficient condition on the (non-
adaptive) step size sequences of the agents and of the central
coordinator and on the augmentation of the Lagrangian such
that the proposed algorithm converges to a (variationally
stable) Nash equilibrium.
As a matter of course, the proposed algorithm can also be
used by a system designer to design agent control algorithms
in order to generate a desirable collective behavior in the
case that the latter coincides with the Nash equilibrium of
the considered coupled constrained game. This is done by
correspondingly designing localized agent utility function
and designing a related coordination strategy. According to
our recommendation, the system designer might realize the
latter based on iterative communications with a central co-
ordinator that can gather and broadcast information from/to
the population. The motivation for this semi-decentralized
approach arises from the privacy demand between the agents,
and the computational intractability of a fully centralized
solution.
Relation to Prior Works: [17] provides, among other
things, a deterministic analysis of the online mirror ascent
algorithm for games with a continuous action set. In contrast
to this work, we consider games with continuous action sets
which underlies in addition to coupling constraint so that the
admissible set of population strategy profile is not necessarily
of product structure. We have to modify the decentralized
algorithm given in [17] and make use of a central coordinator
in order to handle such additional constraints. For this reason,
our work is an extension of the deterministic result given in
[17].
[18] gives the most recent semi-decentralized first-order
algorithm for finding equilibrium and handling coupled con-
straints.There, the authors leverage mostly from the fixed-
point method for finding the solution of variational inequality
(see e.g., Chapter 12 in [19]), which results in (Euclidean-
)projection-based algorithm. Our algorithm is based more
generally on the mirror map, which constitutes a general-
ization of the Euclidean projection. For this reason, we are
not able to use the usual fixed-point approach for variational
inequality. Moreover, the asymmetric algorithm proposed in
[18] uses constant step size in contrast to our algorithm,
which uses variable step size.
We take the inspiration for the method of augmentation
of the Lagrangian from the work [20]. There, the authors
provide an algorithm for online optimization with sub-linear
regret bound able to handle constraint. The method of
augmentation of the Lagrangian helps to obtain a sub-linear
bound on the violation of constraints.
Basic Notations: In this work we consider always the
linear Euclidean space RD . The projection onto the closed
convex subset A of RD is denoted by ΠA. The dual norm
of a norm } ¨ } on RD is denoted by } ¨ }˚. F : R
D Ñ RD
is said to be Lipschitz continuous on an a non-empty subset
Z Ă pRD, } ¨ }q with constant L ą 0 if
}F pxq ´ F pzq}˚ ď L}x´ z}, @x, z P Z
. F is said to be monotone on Z if:
xx1 ´ x2, F px1q ´ F px2qy ď 0,
for all x1, x2 P Z . If in the latter strict inequality hold for
x1 ‰ x2, then F is said to be strictly monotone.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTIONS
We consider a non-cooperative game (NG) Γ played by
a finite set of players rN s “ t1, . . . , Nu. During the game
each player i P rN s can choose an action/strategy xpiq from a
non-empty compact convex subset Xi of a finite-dimensional
normed space pRDi , } ¨ }iq. A usual assumption on the action
set is the following:
Assumptions 1: Xi is a non-empty compact convex subset
of a finite dimensional space Vi.
The payoff/reward for player i P rN s is given by the
function ui : X Ñ R, where X “
ś
iXi, and the actual
action/strategy-profile x “ pxp1q, . . . , xpNqq P X :“
ś
iXi.
If we work with the whole population, we consider the
normed space p
śN
i“1 R
Di , |||¨|||q, where |||x||| :“
ř
i }x
piq}i.
In order to highlight the action of player i we often write
x “ pxpiq, xp´iqq where xp´iq “ pxpjqqj‰i. Moreover, we
mostly assume in this work the following regularity condition
for the utility functions:
Assumptions 2: For all i P rN s and xp´iq P X´i,
uipp¨q, x
p´iqq is concave and
vipxq :“ ∇xpiquipxq
is continuous.
In this work, we are specifically interested in NG Γ
with coupled constraints (NGCC), i.e. in NG Γ which is
in addition subject to coupled inequality constraints
C :“ tx P RN : gipxq ď 0, i P rM su,
or in the vectorized form C :“ tgpxq ď 0u. So the set of
feasible strategy profile is
Q :“ C X X
which we assumed to be non-empty, and correspondingly the
set of feasible strategy for player i is
Q
piqpxp´iqq :“ txpiq P Xi : gpxq ď 0, u.
We denote NGCC by Γ “ prN s, u,X , Cq, where u :“
pu1, . . . , uNq. For simplicity, we consider more specifically
linear constraint, where
gpxq “ Ax´b with A “ rAp:,1q, . . . , Ap:,Nqs P R
Mˆ
ř
N
i“1 Di ,
where Ap:,jq P R
MˆDj , and where b P RM . In this case,
each agents is assume to now only its contribution to the
inequality constraints, which means that Ap:,iq is only visible
to agent i.
The following regularity condition on Q is useful for later
purposes:
Assumptions 3 (Slater’s condition): There exists x˚ P
relintpX q s.t. Ax˚ ă b, where relintpX q denotes the relative
interior of X .
Mirror Map and Fenchel Coupling: In general, first order
evolution takes place in the dual space. So, in order to realize
their actions, the agents need a mapping to project the iterate
back to their individual constraint sets. A canonical way to
do this is by means of the following:
Definition 1 (Regularizer/penalty fct. and Mirror Map):
Let Z be a compact convex subset of a normed space
pE, } ¨ }q, and K ą 0. We say ψ : Z Ñ R is a K-strongly
convex regularizer (or penalty function) on Z , if ψ is
continuous and K-strongly convex on Z , in the sense that
for all x, y P X and λ P r0, 1s:
ψpλx`p1´λqyq ď λψpxq`p1´λqψpyq´K
2
λp1´λq}x´y}2.
The mirror map Φ : E˚ Ñ Z induced by ψ is defined by:
Φpyq :“ argmax
xPX
txx, yy ´ ψpxqu .
In case that the convex conjugate:
ψ˚pyq “ max
xPZ
txy, xy ´ ψpxqu
of the K-strongly convex regularizer ψ on Z is known, one
can compute the mirror map by Φ “ ∇ψ˚. Moreover, it can
be shown that Φ is 1{K-Lipschitz continuous. For a proof
of those facts, see e.g. Theorem 23.5 in [21] and Theorem
12.60(b) in [22].
Mirror map constitutes a generalization of the usual Eu-
clidean projection operator. Interesting example of mirror
map is the so called logit choice:
Φpyq “
exppyqřD
l“1 exppylq
which is generated by the penalty function:
ψpxq “
Dÿ
k“1
xk log xk,
known as the Gibbs entropy, on the simplex ∆ Ă pRD, }}1q.
As noticed in [23], a convex regularizer induces canoni-
cally the following notion of "distance":
Definition 2 (Fenchel Coupling [23]): Let ψ : X Ñ R be
a penalty function on X . Then the Fenchel coupling induced
by ψ is defined as
F pp, yq “ ψppq ` ψ˚pyq ´ xp, yy, p P X , y P E˚.
Some useful properties of the Fenchel coupling is stated in
the following (for proof see [23]):
Proposition 1: Let F be the Fenchel coupling induced by a
K-strongly convex regularizer of X . For p P X , y, y
1
P V˚,
we have:
1) F pp, yq ě pK{2q}Φpyq ´ p}2
2) F pp, y
1
q ď F pp, yq`xy
1
´y,Φpyq´py`p1{2Kq}y
1
´
y}2˚
Throughout this work, we assume that each agent i P
rN s possess a Ki-strongly convex regularizer ψi which
induces the mirror map Φi, and the Fenchel coupling Fi.
In order to emphasize the action of the whole population,
we sometimes use the operator Φ :
ś
iR
Di Ñ X , y ÞÑ
pΦ1py
p1qq, . . . ,ΦN py
pNqqq and the "total" Fenchel coupling
FN : X ˆ
ś
iR
Di , px, yq ÞÑ
ř
i Fipxi, yiq.
Algorithm: The evolution of the agents which we con-
cerned with in this work is given in the following:
Algorithm 1 Mirror ascent with Augmented Lagrangian
(MAAL)
Require: Step size sequence pγtqt, augmentation sequence
pθtqt, initial dual action Y
piq
0
P V˚i , and initial dual variable
λ0.
for t “ 1, 2, . . . do
for every player i P rN s do
Play X
piq
t Ð ΦipY
piq
t q
Observe vipXtq
Update Y
piq
t`1 Ð Y
piq
t ` γtpvipXtq ´A
T
p:,iqλtq
end for
Central operator update:
λt`1 Ð ΠRMě0 pλt ` γt rpAXt ´ bq ´ θtλtsq
Central operator broadcast λt`1 to all players.
end for
The difference between usual online mirror ascent is
that the gradient update for agent i has an additional term
involving his contribution to the constraint set (ATp:,iq) and
the price vector λt provided by the central coordinator. For
this reason, we speak of semi-decentralized update. The
price vector is updated via projected gradient ascent for
maximizing the augmented Lagrangian dual objective. The
aspect of augmentation of Lagrangian is reflected in the term
´θtλt. By this reason, pθtqt is called augmentation sequence.
III. VARIATIONAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUILIBRIUMS
A classical notion of equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium.
It describes the state in which no agent can increase his
payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy:
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium): x˚ P C is a Nash equilib-
rium of the NGCC Γ “ prN s, u,X , Cq, if for every i P rN s:
uipx˚q ě uipx
piq, x
p´iq
˚ q, @x
piq P Qpiqpx
p´iq
˚ q (1)
A. Variational Inequality and Nash equilibrium
Rather than with the concept of Nash equilibrium, it is
advantageous from the analytical point of view to work with
the concept of the so-called variational inequality (VI):
Definition 4: Let Z be a subset of a finite dimensional
normed space pE, } ¨ }q, and suppose that F : Z Ñ E˚.
A point x P Z is a solution of the variational inequality
VIpZ, F q, if xx´ x, F pxqy ď 0, @x P Z . The set of solution
of VIpX , F q is denoted by SOLpX , F q.
The usual first order optimality condition for convex opti-
mization asserts the following relation between two concepts:
Proposition 2: If Assumption 2 holds, then SOLpQ, vq is a
subset of the set of Nash equilibriums.
In the case where no coupling constraint is present, i.e. C “
X , then the converse of above proposition holds. However,
due to the coupling constraint, a Nash equilibrium has not
to be a solution of variational inequality.
Another nice thing about VI is that under mild condition
one can establish existence of its solution. For instance it is
known that in case Z ‰ H is compact and convex and
F is continuous, then there exists at least a solution of
SOLpZ, F q. Moreover in case that F “ v and Z “ Q,
the latter and Proposition 2 implies the existence of a Nash
equilibrium for Γ:
Proposition 3: Suppose that the Assumption 2 holds. Then
Γ has a Nash equilibrium. In case that Assumption 2 holds
in the strict manner, then Γ has a unique Nash equilibrium.
B. Decoupling the Constraints by means of Lagrangian
Method
As we have already seen, the equilibrium of the con-
strained game Γ is related to the solution of the variational
inequality VIpQ, vq. In order to analyze VIpQ, vq it is
convenient to extend the previous problem to the problem
VIpX ˆ RM` , v˜q, where v˜ : X ˆ R
M
` ,
v˜ : X ˆ RM` , px, λq ÞÑ
“
vpxq ´ATλ,Ax´ b
‰T
.
The advantage of this method is the decoupling of the
constraint set, i.e. we only have to handle with the constraint
set X ˆRMě0 with product structure rather than with Q. The
following shows that there is no burden in doing this:
Proposition 4: Suppose that Assumption 2 and Assumption
3 holds. The following statements are equivalent:
1) x P Q is a solution of VIpQ, vq
2) There exists λ P RMě0 s.t. px, λq is a solution of VIpXˆ
R
M
` , v˜q.
The proof is standard KKT argumentation and based on e.g.
1.3.4 Proposition in [19] (see also Subsubsection 4.3.2.2 in
[1]).
So in order to solve VIpQ, vq it is sufficient to seek for
the solution of VIpX ˆRM` , v˜q. It follows from Proposition
5, we need to seek for the latter for variationally stable set
for pX ˆ RM` , v˜q, assuming that it is non-empty.
C. Variational Inequality and Variational Stability
In case that G is a monotone operator, it holds:
xx´x,Gpxqy ď xx´x,Gpxqy ď 0, @x P Z, x P SOLpZ, Gq.
This motivates to introduce the following notion:
Definition 5: We say that a closed VSpZ, F q Ă Z is a
variationally stable set for pZ, F q, if:
xx´ x, F pxqy ď 0 @x P Z, x P VSpZ, F q (2)
with equality for a given x P VSpZ, F q if and only if x P
VSpZ, F q.
As we will see later, it is convenient algorithmically to
work with the concept of variational stability instead with
the concept of variational inequality. However, the following
gives that under mild condition, both concepts are the same:
Proposition 5: Suppose that VSpZ, F q ‰ H. Then
VSpZ, F q “ SOLpZ, F q.
Proof: Let x P SOLpZ, F q but x R VSpZ, F q. We have
since x P SOLpZ, F q, xx ´ x, F pxqy ď 0, @x P Z . So in
particular for an x˚ P Z˜:
xx˚ ´ x, F pxqy ď 0. (3)
Moreover, since x R VSpZ, F q and x˚ P VSpZ, F q, we
have xx´x˚, F pxqy ă 0 and thus xx
˚´x, F pxqy ą 0. This
contradicts to (3), so that we can imply the desired statement.
Remark 1: The assumption that VSpZ, F q ‰ H is closed
appears at the first sight forced. However, if Z is a nonempty
compact convex set, F “ ∇g where g : Z Ñ R is a
concave function then the assumption is true. Indeed Since
g is concave, ∇g is monotone. Therefore:
xx´ x,∇gpxq ´∇gpxqy ď 0.
By the first-order optimality condition we have for x˚ P
argmax g and x P Z , x∇gpxq, x ´ xy ď 0 and thus by
monotonicity:
xx´ x,∇gpxqy ď xx´ x,∇gpxqy ď 0.
Moreover concavity asserts that x∇gpxq, x ´ x˚y ă 0
whenever x is not a maximizer of g. Thus we have that
argmax g “ VSpZ,∇gq and the fact that argmax g ‰ H
implies that VSpZ,∇gq ‰ H. Moreover it is easy to see that
argmax g is closed.
IV. BOUND FOR PRIMAL-DUAL ITERATE VIA FENCHEL
COUPLING
We begin by measuring the distance between the evolution
of each agents and a strategy profile by means of the "total"
Fenchel coupling FN , which is crucial to provide conver-
gence theorem for MAAL. By using Proposition 1, inserting
the iterate of the algorithm, using triangle inequality, we have
for all x P X :
FN px, Yt`1q ´ F
N px, Ytq ďγtxxXt ´ x, vpXtq ´A
Tλtyy
`
γ2t
2K
pC2
1
` C2
2
}λt}
2
2
q
where C1, C2 ą 0 are constants fulfilling:
|||vpxq|||˚ ď C1,
ˇˇˇˇ ˇˇ
ATλ
ˇˇˇˇ ˇˇ
˚
ď C2}λ}2, @x P X , λ P R
M
ě0.
(4)
By summing over all t “ 0, . . . , T and subsequent telescop-
ing, we obtain a bound for
E
p1q
T pxq :“ F
N px, YT q ´ F
N px, Y0q.
That is:
E
p1q
T pxq ď
Tÿ
t“0
γt
“
xxXt ´ x, vpXtq ´A
Tλtyy
‰
`
C2
1
2K
Tÿ
t“0
γ2t
`
C2
2
2K
Tÿ
t“0
γ2t }λt}
2
2
, (5)
In order to eliminate the term (5) involving the dual iterate
λt, we now estimate of the distance between the dual iterate
and any dual point. We can bound:
E
p2q
T pλq :“ p}λ´ λT }
2
2
´ }λ´ λ0}
2
2
q{2
for any λ P RMě0 by:
E
p2q
T pλq ď
Tÿ
t“0
γtxλt ´ λ,AXt ´ by ´
Tÿ
t“0
γtθt
2
p}λt}
2
2
´ }λ}2q
`
Tÿ
t“0
γ2t pC
2
3
` θ2t }λt}
2
2
q, (6)
where C3 ą 0 is a constant fulfilling:
}Ax}2 ď C3. (7)
(6) can be proven in the similar manner as the proof of (5).
By combining (5) and (6) we obtain immediately the
following estimate for the evolution of:
F˜ ppx, λq, pYT , λT qq :“ F
N px, YT q ` p}λt ´ λ}
2
2
{2q,
which is:
Theorem 6: Let C1, C2, C3 ą 0 be constants fulfilling (4)
and (7). It holds for:
ET px, λq :“ F˜ ppx, λq, pYT , λT qq ´ F˜ ppx, λq, pY0 , λ0qq
and for all px, λq P X ˆ RMě0:
ET px, λq ď
Tÿ
t“0
γtxxpXt, λtq ´ px, λq, v˜pXt, λtqyy„
` C˜1
Tÿ
t“0
γ2t `
Tÿ
t“0
γtθt}λ}
2
2
2
`
Tÿ
t“0
γt}λt}
2
2
”
γt
´
2θ2t ` C˜2
¯
´ θt
2
ı
where:
C˜1 :“
C2
1
2K
` 2C2
3
C˜2 :“
C2
2
2K
,
and for all x, x˜ P
ś
iR
Di and λ, λ˜ P RM :
xxpx, λq, px˜, λ˜qyy„ “ xxx, x˜yy ` xλ, λ˜y.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section we investigate the convergence of MAAL
to the variational stable set VSpQ, vq. As already discuss
in Section III, this leads, in the case that VSpQ, vq ‰ H,
to the convergence of MAAL to the solution SOLpQ, vq of
variational inequality VIpQ, vq and to the convergence of
MAAL to the corresponding subset of the Nash equilibrium
of Γ. By 1. in proposition 1 it follows that convergence with
respect to FN implies the convergence of the iterate w.r.t. the
underlying norm |||¨|||. Therefore the bound for FN px, YT q
provided in previous section helps us to establish the desired
statement. For technical reason, it is advantageous to have
the converse property:
Assumptions 4: For any p P X and any sequence pYnqn in
V˚, it holds: ΦpYnq Ñ p ñ F
N pp, Ynq Ñ 0
Define for C Ă X and C˜ Ă X ˆ RMě0:
FN pC, yq :“ inf
 
FN px, yq : x P C
(
F˜ pC˜, zq :“ inf
!
F˜ px, yq : x P C
)
Notice that the property given (4) holds also in case that p
is substituted more generally by a closed set:
Proposition 7: Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Let C be a
closed subset of X and C˜ be a closed subset of XˆRMě0. Then
ΦpYtq Ñ C if and only if F
N pC, yq Ñ 0 and pΦpYtq, λ˜tq Ñ
C˜ if and only if FN pC˜, pΦpYtq, λ˜tqq Ñ 0
In the following, we state the following convergence
statement for the iterate pXt, λtq of MAAL:
Theorem 8: Let C˜2 ą 0 be a constant as given in Theorem
6. Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Suppose that pγtqt
satisfies:
8ÿ
t“0
γt “ 8,
řT
t“1 γ
2
tř
T
t“1 γt
Ñ 0, T Ñ8. (8)
For an augmentation sequence pθtqt satisfying:
řT
t“1 γtθtř
T
t“1 γt
Ñ 0, T Ñ8, (9)
and:
γt
´
2θ2t ` C˜2
¯
´ θt
2
ď 0, for large t ě 0. (10)
It holds for the iterates of MAAL:
1) There exists a subsequence pXtk , λtkqk of pXt, λtqt s.t.
pXtk , λtkq Ñ VSpX ˆ R
M
ě0, v˜q as k Ñ8.
2) pXt, λtq Ñ VSpX ˆ R
M
ě0, v˜q as tÑ8,
Proof: To show the first statement of the Theorem,
notice that:
ET px˚, λ˚q
ď τT
´ř
T
t“0 γtξtpx˚,λ˚q
τT
` C˜1
ř
T
t“0 γ
2
t
τT
`
ř
t
t“0 γTψt
τT
¯
, (11)
where τT :“
řT
t“0 γk,
ξtpx˚, λ˚q :“ xxpXt, λtq ´ px˚, λ˚q, v˜pXt, λtqyy„,
ψt :“ }λt}
2
2
”
γt
´
2θ2t ` C˜2
¯
´ θt
2
ı
`
θt}λ}
2
2
2
ď
θt}λ}
2
2
2
,
(12)
where the inequality in (12) follows by (10). Let be U be an
arbitrary neighborhood (w.r.t. a norm e.g. } ¨ }2) of VSpX ˆ
R
M
ě0, v˜q. Suppose that pXt, λtq R U for all sufficiently large
t ě 0. We may assume w.l.o.g. that Xt R U for all t ě 0. So
for all px˚, λ˚q P VSpX ˆ R
M
ě0, vq, it follows that we can
find c ą 0 s.t. ξtpx˚, λ˚q ď ´c, @t ě 0. This yields:
ET px˚, λ˚q ď τT
´
´c` C˜1
řT
t“0 γ
2
t
τT
`
řt
t“0 γtψt
τT
¯
. (13)
(8) (resp. (12) and (9)) gives that the second (resp. third)
summand in (13) converges to 0 as t goes to infinity.
Finally, by the fact that τT Ñ 8 as T Ñ 8, we have
ET px˚, λ˚q Ñ ´8, n Ñ 8, which contradicts the fact
that F˜ ppx˚, λ˚q, pY0, λ0qq is finite. Thus pXt, λtq P U for
infinitely many t ě 0.
To show the convergence of pXt, λtq, i.e. the second
statement of the Theorem, it is sufficient by 2. in Proposition
1 to show that for all ǫ ą 0, and:
Uǫ :“
!
px, λq : x “ Φpyq, F˜ pVSpX ˆ RMě0, v˜q, py, λqq ă ǫ
)
pXt, λtq P Uǫ for all but finite t P N. Toward this end,
we show that for sufficiently large t, pXt, λtq P Uǫ implies
pXt`1, λt`1q P Uǫ. Combining this fact with Lemma 8 yields
finally the desired statement.
We have by 3. in Proposition 1 and by 1. in Lemma 8:
F˜ ppx˚, λ˚q, pYt`1, λt`1qq ď F˜ ppx˚, λ˚q, pYt`1, λt`1qq
` γtξtppx˚, λ˚qq ` γtψt ` γ
2
t C˜1, (14)
for a constant C˜ ą 0. Suppose that pXt, λtq P Uǫ. By
Assumption 4 it holds that Uǫ{2 contains a neighborhood
of VSpX ˆ RMě0, v˜q (say w.r.t. } ¨ }2). Otherwise we have
that any neighborhood of VSpX ˆ RMě0, v˜q w.r.t. |||¨||| is not
contained Uǫ{2, and since the image of Φ coincides with the
domain of the subdifferential of ψ and ψ is subdifferentiable
on the interior of X , we can choose a sequence pY˜tqt in
V˚ and a sequence pλ˜ntq in R
M
ě0 satisfying pΦpY˜tq, λ˜tq Ñ
VSpX ˆ RMě0, v˜q but pΦpY˜tq, λ˜tq R Uǫ{2, i.e. F˜ pVSpX ˆ
R
M
ě0, v˜q, pΦpY˜tq, λ˜tqq ě ǫ{2. Since VSpXˆR
M
ě0, v˜q is closed,
the latter contradicts with Proposition 7.
Now, an implication of the fact that Uǫ{2 contains a
neighborhood of VSpX ˆ RMě0, v˜q is that for all px˚, λ˚q P
VSpX ˆ RMě0, v˜q, there exists c ą 0 s.t.
xxv˜px, λq, px, λq ´ px˚, λ˚qyy ď ´c, @x P UǫzUǫ{2
So, if Xn P UǫzUǫ{2 (14) yields:
F˜ ppx˚, λ˚q, pYt`1, λt`1qq
ď F˜ ppx˚, λ˚q, pYt, λtqq ` γtp´c` ψt ` γtC˜1q,
By (12), we have |ψt| Ñ 0 for t Ñ 8 and thus
for large enough t P N, there exists c˜ ą 0 s.t.
F˜ ppx˚, λ˚q, pYt`1, λt`1qq ď F˜ ppx˚, λ˚q, pYt, λtqq`γtp´c˜`
γtC˜1q. and consequently for sufficiently large t P N s.t. the
inequality before and γt ď c˜{C˜ holds, we have F˜ pVSpX ˆ
R
M
ě0q, pYt`1, λt`1qq ď F˜ pVSpX ˆ R
M
ě0q, pYt, λtqqq ă ǫ,
since by assumption pXt, λtq P Uǫ.
If pXt, λtq P Uǫ{2, then it follows from (14):
F˜ ppx˚, λ˚q, pYt`1, λt`1qq
ď F˜ ppx˚, λ˚q, pYt`1, λt`1qq ` γtψt ` γ
2
nC˜.
Thus for sufficiently large t P N s.t. γtψt ` γ
2
t C˜ ă ǫ{2, we
have F˜ pVSpX ˆ RMě0q, pYt`1, λt`1qq ă ǫ. We are done by
combining all the observations.
The convergence pXtqt is now immediate:
Corollary 9: Suppose that the assumptions given in Theorem
8 holds and suppose that VSpQ, vq,VSpX ˆ RMě0, v˜q ‰ H.
Then Xn Ñ VSpQ, vq.
Proof: Theorem 8 asserts that pXt, λtq Ñ VSpX ˆ
R
M
ě0, v˜q. Proposition 4 and the assumption VSpX ˆ
R
M
ě0, v˜q ‰ H implies that VSpX ˆ R
M
ě0, v˜q “ SOLpX ˆ
R
M
ě0, v˜q. Moreover Proposition 5 asserts that px, λq P
SOLpXˆRMě0, v˜q implies that x P SOLpXˆR
M
ě0, vq. Finally,
since VSpQ, vq ‰ H we have VSpQ, vq “ SOLpQ, vq.
At last, let us provide an example of sequences pγtq and pθtq
which fulfills the condition given in Theorem 8:
Remark 2: Suppose that γt “ 1{pt` 1q, then the condition
(8) is fulfilled since
ř8
k“1 γk “ 8 and
ř8
k“1 γ
2
k ă 8. For
θt “ δγt, we have:
γtp2θ
2
t ` C˜2q ´
θt
2
“ γt
”
2δγ2t ` C˜2 ´
δ
2
ı
.
In case δ ą 2C˜2, we can find c ą 0 s.t.:
γtp2θ
2
t ` C˜2q ´
θt
2
ď γt
“
2δγ2t ´ c
‰
.
The latter is clearly negative for t sufficiently large.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND OUTLOOKS
In this work we have introduce a novel semi-decentralized
algorithm for concave games with coupled constraints based
on mirror ascent and the method of augmented lagrangian.
We provide a sufficient condition on the step size sequence
and the degree of augmentation such that the algorithm
converges to variationally stable Nash equilibrium. Specific
choices of step-size sequence and augmentation sequence for
that purpose is also provided. In particular, step size of order
γt “ Op1{tq leads to this desired state.
In the future work we plan also to investigate the case
where the step-size - and augmentation sequence is adaptive.
Moreover it is interesting to know whether the case where
step size sequences of the agents differ.
Another interesting line of work is to investigate whether
the algorithm is robust toward random disturbance. That is
to investigate how the algorithm performance if the feedback
obtained by the agents is an unbiased martingale estimate of
the gradient.
We also plan to derive based on the algorithm given in this
work an algorithm which ensures not only compliance in the
asymptotic region but also in the non-asymptotic region.
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